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The Transparency of Credit Ratings – 
Reconstruction of Hungary’s Sovereign Rating*
Gábor Hajnal – Nóra Szűcs
After the crisis that commenced in 2008, the observed procyclicality and the slow 
responses of the credit rating institutions to credit risk events cast strong doubts 
on the justification of the major role of the credit rating agencies in the financial 
markets and the reliability of their ratings. Therefore, this case study examines 
the extent to which the reconstruction of the foreign currency denominated debt 
ratings of Hungary, as a sovereign issuer, can be implemented accurately under the 
present transparency of the credit rating processes, i.e. to what degree the indicative 
rating range, obtained on the basis of the credit rating agencies’ methodology, 
explains the actual credit rating. Using the publicly available methodological 
documentation of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, we performed 
the model calculation of Hungary’s credit rating at the three institutions. Although 
the level of transparency of the three rating agencies has improved, ratings for 
Hungary could only be reconstructed with some uncertainty. Major progress could 
only be achieved if the rating agencies calculated the input indicators of the model 
from known data sources with known calculation at all times.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: F34, G15, G24
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1. Introduction
Structured credit products, which were downgraded after the financial crisis that 
erupted in 2008, and the downgrading of sovereign issuers facing severe funding 
difficulties as a result of the crisis brought the activity of the credit rating agencies into 
the focus of experts. With regard to the development of the crisis, many questioned 
the justification of the major role of credit rating agencies in the market, as well as 
the reliability of their ratings (Benmelech – Dlugosz 2009; Crotty 2009; White 2010; 
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Iyengar 2012). In December 2008, structured products accounted for roughly 35 
per cent of the US bond market, with a magnitude of USD 1013, more than half of 
which received AAA rating from Moody’s; then one third of them was shortly subject 
to significant downgrading (Benmelech – Dlugosz 2009). Such events signalled that 
this was a complex problem. On the one hand, it was known already before the 
crisis that the business model of the rating agencies generates conflicts of interest, 
where the rated entity is the user of the rating service, i.e. the source of the rating 
agency’s revenues (O’Sullivan et al. 2012). At the same time, the crisis made it 
clear: the models of the rating agencies also contain methodological errors (Utzig 
2010). With a view to improving the quality of the credit ratings and mitigating the 
uncertainties surrounding the activity of the rating agencies, the regulatory authorities 
significantly expanded the regulation of the sector (IMF 2010; European Council 2009, 
2011). Owing to these regulatory efforts, the credit rating agencies have rendered 
their decision-making processes more transparent and published more detailed 
methodologies than before. In addition, in the rating action reports accompanying 
their credit rating decisions, they publish several pieces of information that reveal the 
criteria and economic developments they consider upon the classification of issuers.
This paper, as a case study focusing on Hungary, examines the accuracy – with 
the present transparency of the credit rating processes – of the reconstruction 
of the ratings of Hungary, as a sovereign issuer, i.e. to what extent the indicative 
rating range, obtained on the basis of the credit rating agencies’ methodological 
documentation, explains the actual credit rating. Due to length constraints, 
emphasising the character of a case study, we perform the analysis only for one of 
Hungary’s ratings, i.e. for foreign currency-denominated debt. This choice ensures 
the comparison of our conclusions with similar results in the Hungarian technical 
literature. (See later in more detail the comments on the 2016 work of Ligeti – Szőrfi.)
To answer the research question, on the one hand we review in detail the publicly 
available methodological documentation of the three dominant credit rating 
agencies, i.e. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings, and then, based 
on the methodological documentation, we examine the accuracy of the possible 
modelling of Hungary’s sovereign debt rating at the three institutions. In addition, 
the research takes account of the credit rating reports published following the 
respective review by the institutions, the information content of which also 
contributes to the more accurate model calculation of the real credit ratings. We 
performed the reconstruction of the model calculation for all three institutions for 
the date of the latest available credit rating review, which was 4 November 2016 
in the case of Moody’s, 16 February 2018 in the case of S&P and 9 March 2018 in 
the case of Fitch. This paper solely examines the extent to which the ratings are 
reconstructible accurately, and we do not examine the “correctness” and forecasting 
capacity of the models. Beyond length constraints, such an analysis would be limited 
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by the fact that the possibility of reconstructing the model of the three rating 
agencies – as is seen later – remains still limited.
The colleagues of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank have already dealt with the 
methodological issues of the credit ratings and the reconstruction thereof with 
regard to Hungary within the framework of a series of technical articles; however, 
since then more detailed methodological documentation has been published, which 
calls for a repeated analysis and facilitates the understanding of the credit rating 
agencies’ decision-making processes even more accurately. This is particularly true 
for the methodological documentation of Fitch Ratings, which had not yet published 
a methodology suitable for reconstruction at the time when the earlier papers 
were written; however, the present description is already detailed enough for us 
to attempt a reproduction of the rating. In addition to the foregoing, we deem it 
important to emphasise that this paper relies substantially on the results of the 
relevant research published earlier.
In the following, we first briefly describe the role of credit rating institutions in 
the financial markets, and then review the preliminaries of our research in the 
literature. Thereafter, we describe the general methodology of the credit rating of 
sovereign issuers, followed by a review of the three rating agencies’ methodologies. 
Finally, we model the calculation of Hungary’s credit rating at the three institutions. 
The paper is closed with a summary and conclusion.
2. Functions of the credit rating agencies in the financial markets
In its October 2010 “Global Financial Stability Report”, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) paid special attention to the issues of credit rating institutions affecting 
financial stability, and – with reference to the relevant international literature – 
discussed the fundamental functions of credit rating agencies in detail. According to 
the IMF paper, credit rating agencies have essentially three functions in the financial 
markets: (1) to provide information on the entities they rate; (2) to encourage 
borrowers to take corrective measures; and (3) to provide issuers with certificates 
(IMF 2010). In the following paragraphs, we briefly review the performance of 
these three functions.
In the case of external financing, e.g. borrowing, there is an information asymmetry 
between the party in need of financing and the party that provides the financing. The 
party providing the external financing does not know in full the potential success of 
the project and activity to be financed, or the efforts of the party raising the capital 
as to whether it focuses on the maximisation of the full value of the project or only 
on its private benefit. This information asymmetry gives way to moral hazard, i.e. the 
financed project owner becomes inclined to maximise its own utility in the absence of 
proper incentives. Accordingly, in a lending situation, credit rationing can be observed: 
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projects with positive net present value are either not implemented at all, or they are 
implemented in a smaller than optimal volume (Tirole 2006).
The rather complex risk appearing in a lending situation is generally referred to as 
credit risk. Jorion (1999) refers to it as the risk when the borrower fails to fulfil the 
interest due and/or principal instalment in part or in full, or does not fulfil on the 
due date. He also considers it to the part of the credit risk when the probability of 
these events increases. MNB Recommendation 1/2017 states as follows: “Credit 
risk is a risk, jeopardising the profitability and capital position, arising from partial or 
complete non-fulfilment (or from fulfilment not in compliance with the conditions of 
the contract) of the contracting parties’ obligation, i.e. from the partial or complete 
non-fulfilment of (on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet) obligations outstanding 
vis-à-vis the financial institution.” (MNB 2017:3). Of the credit risk types detailed 
in the MNB Recommendation, sovereign risk1 is the one that is forecasted by the 
rating agencies’ sovereign models. Non-fulfilment by sovereign issuers is closely 
related to the notion of sovereign default, a topic which we only mention briefly 
due to length constraints. For example, Vidovics-Dancs (2013, 2014, 2015) deals 
with this topic in her papers. We only cite one definition of sovereign default by 
the author: “sovereign default is usually defined as the failure of a sovereign state 
to discharge its payment obligations related to its credit liability or discharging it 
not in accordance with the original conditions, and thereby causing a loss to the 
lender” (Vidovics-Dancs 2014:264). This definition corresponds to the definitions 
used in the international literature, but more importantly it also corresponds to 
the approach of Fitch, S&P and Moody’s.
This is the point where the credit rating agencies have a role in a lending situation. 
The market assumes that the rating agencies usually have an informational 
advantage compared to an average investor in the assessment of the payment ability 
and payment willingness of the inspected issuer, and of its credit risk resulting from 
these two parameters (Melnick 2008). Since the rating agencies primarily measure 
the relative risk of the non-fulfilment of the borrowers’ financial obligations, their 
primary role in the financial markets is to provide accurate and reliable information, 
thereby mitigating the informational asymmetry existing at the two ends of the 
credit relation (IMF 2010; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). Elimination of the informational 
asymmetry is mutually advantageous for lenders and borrowers: lenders can 
invest with a more accurate knowledge of the credit risk, while borrowers can 
raise funds at lower costs (Fennel – Medvedev 2011; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). Thus, 
the information provided by the rating agencies may also increase the number of 
potential borrowers, which contributes to the establishment of liquid markets (IMF 
2010). All of this leads to a decrease in credit rationing, the projects not financed 
1  “it is a sub-type of country risk, and means the risk arising from the default of the country vis-à-vis which 
the financial organisation has an exposure” (MNB 2017:3)
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or financed at higher cost earlier can be implemented or realised at lower cost, 
i.e. the activity of the rating agencies also enhances social welfare (Tirole 2006).
Another major role of the rating agencies manifests itself in a kind of monitoring 
activity; with this they motivate the borrower to perform adjustments with a view 
to preventing downgrading (IMF 2010; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). The means of this 
include the warnings related to potential downgrading, communicated in the credit 
rating review. A positive credit rating assessment is of crucial importance, because 
a potential downgrade may generate additional negative impacts for the borrowers, 
since most institutional investors are not allowed by regulations to keep low-graded 
securities in their portfolio (IMF 2010).
Although the positive effects of the rating agencies’ monitoring activity are 
unquestionable, potential downgrades may entail spillover effects, which can 
also destabilise financial markets (IMF 2010). This problem stems from the rating 
agencies’ third basic function, i.e. from the issue of certificates, since rating 
categories have now become integral parts of a number of regulatory requirements 
and financial contracts (IMF 2010; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). Utzig (2010) also emphasises 
that the use of credit ratings for regulatory purposes makes a huge contribution to 
the procyclical effect of ratings.
However, the rating agencies perform the aforementioned functions in the 
knowledge of the occasionally contradictory requirements of the stakeholders. 
The most evident requirement is that the models of the rating agencies should be 
representative of the issuer and the securities, and provide a good forecast of credit 
risk events. In addition to the precise description of the credit risk related to the 
issuer/securities, stability is also an issue: how “sensitive” a good model should be 
to the momentary, potentially temporary, changes in the circumstances of the rated 
entity. Timeliness is also in important issue, but perhaps it can be handled better 
than the previous one. Accordingly, accuracy, stability and timeliness are all justified 
requirements concerning the ratings; however, from time to time they can only be 
enforced at the expense of each other (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). Let us consider market 
participants’ expectations with regard to the stability of the ratings, as an example. 
The stability of ratings may be a realistic requirement of investors making decisions 
on the basis of such ratings, since it would be expensive to restructure their portfolio 
upon each minor market movement. The institutions in charge of the oversight of 
the market, traditionally also deem the stability of the ratings to be advantageous, 
since a rating that responds quickly to negative market movements puts additional 
pressure on the market. The interest of the issuers in a stable rating is self-evident; 
for them each change in the rating means a new price negotiation with the providers 
of external finance. In addition, if the rating changes too often, it also questions 
the reliability of the rating agency. Based on all of these motivations, the stability 
of the ratings may be an acceptable objective for all stakeholders. Thus, this simple 
example also illustrates well that even under normal market circumstances, rating 
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agencies face a number of expectations, pondering which they have to perform, as 
far as possible, objective rating over and over again (Melnick 2008).
However, after the 2007–2008 crisis, investors started to voice their concerns 
more loudly that the rating agencies follow market changes too slowly – many 
of them blamed this for “surprises” such as the Enron case, which had not been 
forecasted by any downgrade. With a view to ensuring the stability of the ratings, 
the rating agencies used the through-the-cycle approach, putting more emphasis 
on the long-term components of the credit risk. In addition, they also treated the 
migration of the rated issuers and securities prudently. All of this resulted in severe 
underestimation of the short-term credit risk (Melnick 2008).
Compared to the ordinary condition of the markets, the crisis focused attention on 
additional problems inherent in the system. The moral hazard faced by the rating 
agencies was also previously known, and its role in the fact that the rating did not 
reflect the true financial situation – e.g. in the case of Enron – was not insignificant. 
O’Sullivan et al. (2012) report that the business model of the rating agencies 
fundamentally changed in the 1970s. Previously, the revenue of rating agencies 
came solely from investors for performing specific ratings. However, starting from 
the 1970s issuers could also apply for rating – as a paid service – for the securities 
they intended to issue. Since a better rating means cheaper financing, for which it 
is worthwhile to pay a higher fee to the rating agency, moral hazard appeared in 
the rating situation (O’Sullivan et al. 2012). This moral hazard is particularly strong 
for rating agencies facing fierce competition in their own market, if a substantial 
portion of their revenues is concentrated at a small number of issuers. This is exactly 
what happened in the case of the ill-famed mortgage structure products in the crisis 
(Langohr – Langohr 2010).
Thus, it is understandable that the regulation of rating agencies and oversight of 
their activity became a requirement of market participants after the crisis, the 
results of which we have already mentioned (IMF 2010; European Council 2009, 
2011). The transparency of the rating methodology bears special importance in 
strengthening investor confidence. In this paper, we examine the transparency of the 
methodology by assessing the degree to which the methodological documentation 
of the rating agencies make it possible to reproduce the classification and specific 
rating determined by the agencies. Naturally, transparency helps the users of the 
ratings in assessing the “correctness” of the models – regardless of whether we talk 
about the “correctness” of accuracy, stability or timeliness – but the transparency 
criterion we have selected, i.e. the possibility of accurate reconstruction of specific 
ratings, does not characterise any of these criteria.
In the literature, the antecedents related most closely to our paper are the results 
of Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016). They measure transparency in a more detailed manner than 
this paper; in addition to the reconstructibility of the specific classification, they also 
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examine the reconstructibility of the model itself. The criteria of the authors include: 
“the extent to which the indicators considered are explicitly explained; availability 
of scales applied for the evaluation of the indicators; availability of the weighting 
assigned to individual dimensions; the extent to which the values calculated for 
individual indicators are available; availability of an indication by the agency regarding 
the current evaluation of individual dimensions.” (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016:20). Based on 
the methodological documentation available in 2016, they performed an analysis for 
several countries, including Hungary. They obtained the following results: in the case 
of S&P, they clearly managed to reproduce the indicative rating range, whereas when 
using the Moody’s documentation supplementary assumptions had to be made. In the 
case of Fitch, the published methodology included no information on the weighting 
and scales, and thus the authors did not even attempt to make an estimate.
Apart from the work of co-authors Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016), we find literature relevant 
for our paper mainly in respect of sovereign credit rating models. Very rich literature 
is available on the topic of quantitative economic variables explaining the ratings. 
Typically, the indicators with explanatory power include GDP per capita, real GDP 
growth, the level of external debt, the level of government debt, the fiscal balance, 
GDP growth, inflation, foreign exchange reserves, economic development and the 
number of years elapsed since the last default (Bruha et al. 2017; Afonso et al. 2011). 
In several cases, the authors also test the forecasting power of these models, i.e. 
they also calculate the future ratings (revised rating) with their models. This trend in 
the technical literature can be observed both before and after the crisis, e.g. Afonso 
published several papers on this topic (Afonso 2003; Afonso et al. 2012; Afonso et 
al. 2011) and the earlier work of Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) is also available. The 
paper written at the beginning of 2017 by the colleagues of the European Central 
Bank also mentions that since the rating agencies do not publish their models, a large 
part of the technical literature focuses on the construction of models, which return 
a rating identical to that issued by the rating agencies. The authors of the paper cite 
several research studies – from Bruha et al., through the work of Mora in 20062 to 
Gaillard’s3 results in 2014 – as examples (Bruha et al. 2017).
3. The methodology of sovereign credit rating
Since Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016) have already analysed the methodological issues of 
the rating agencies in detail, upon describing the methodology of sovereign credit 
rating, we partially rely on the information content of the cited research. Our 
objective is that this paper should be the partial continuation of the Ligeti–Szőrfi 
paper, and thus – similarly to them – by the sovereign credit rating of Hungary we 
also mean the credit risk rating of the long-term, foreign currency-denominated 
2  Mora, N. (2006): Sovereign credit ratings: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt? Journal of Banking & Finance, 
30(7): pp. 2041–2062.
3  Gaillard, N. (2014): What Is the Value of Sovereign Ratings? German Economic Review, 15(1): pp. 208–224.
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debt of Hungary (as an issuer) (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016), but we limit the analysis to 
Hungary and do not extend it to the debt of other European countries.
A sovereign credit rating is essentially an opinion formulated on the loan repayment 
capacity and willingness of the respective state (IMF 2010). A sovereign state can 
be deemed insolvent if it is unable to discharge its principal or interest payment 
obligations towards the investors on the due date (IMF 2010). Credit rating agencies 
rank the default risk on a scale, where the sovereign states allocated to the same 
category show similar credit risk (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). The credit risk classifications 
of the three largest rating agencies are illustrated by Figure 1. As shown, the 
sovereign issuers with the best rating receive three “As”, while those with the worst 
rating receive a “D” rating on the credit rating scale. In addition, the rating agencies 
indicate the probability of modifying the current rating by the negative, stable and 
positive outlook and the watch list categories (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016).
Figure 1
Credit rating classifications used by Fitch Ratings, Standard &Poor’s and Moody’s
Fitch Ratings Standard &Poor’s Moody’s
AAA AAA Aaa
AA+ AA+ Aa1
AA AA Aa2
AA– AA– Aa3
A+ A+ A1
A A A2
A– A– A3
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1
BBB BBB Baa2
BBB– BBB– Baa3
BB+ BB+ Ba1
BB BB Ba2
BB– BB– Ba3
B+ B+ B1
B B B2
B– B– B3
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1
CCC CCC Caa2
CCC– CCC– Caa3
CC CC Ca
C C C
D D D
Source: Moody’s (2016a), Fitch (2017a), S&P (2017a)
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The rating framework for the riskiness of the sovereign issuers is provided by the 
model detailed in the methodological documentation of the credit rating agencies. 
The big three rating agencies typically allocate the indicators considered for the 
purposes of sovereign rating to four or five groups of variables, i.e. dimensions. 
Most of the dimensions group distinct variables which are similar in terms of 
magnitude at all three rating agencies. All three institutions use the macro economy 
and general government dimensions, while institutional efficiency is used in the 
model of two actors, i.e. Moody’s and S&P. External balance indicators are used 
by two rating agencies (Fitch and S&P). S&P, contrary to the other two institutions, 
assesses the effectiveness and flexibility of the sovereigns’ monetary policy in 
a separate dimension. Moody’s and Fitch created a separate dimension for event 
risk and structural features, respectively.
The assessment of the individual dimensions is based on certain key variables, 
which are not necessarily identical at the three institutions, and then the model 
may modify the initial score returned by the assessment by considering additional 
variables. The indicators examined by the rating agencies essentially capture 
identical economic processes; however, their calculation methodology and 
weighting within the dimension vary by institution. Furthermore, in respect of the 
credit ratings it should be noted that although the actual credit ratings usually fall 
within the indicative rating level obtained by applying the methodological model, 
the rating committee may decide, from time to time, on a rating other than that 
proposed by the model (Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016).
Another important factor related to the credit rating methodology is that the 
institutions, with a view to avoiding procyclicality, consider multi-year averages 
for certain variables, obtained on the basis of historic, current year and forecast 
values (IMF 2010; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016). This calculation method ensures that the 
ratings reflect the fundamental process of the economy rather than responding to 
fluctuations in business cycles (IMF 2010; Ligeti – Szőrfi 2016).
4. Special features in the methodology of the three rating agencies
In the following part of the paper, we discuss the special features of the 
methodological documentation of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and present the content 
of the latest methodological documentation of all three institutions, prevailing at 
the time of writing this paper.
4.1. Special features of the Moody’s methodology
Moody’s assesses sovereign credit risk in four dimensions. The variables considered 
in these four dimensions are presented in Annex 1 at the end of the paper. The 
Moody’s model, in line with the general credit rating methodology, fine-tunes the 
initial scores obtained on the basis of the key variables by considering additional 
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variables. The prevailing methodology of the institution contains almost all 
information necessary for accurate model calculation: the variables determining 
the basic score of the individual dimension, their weight within the dimension and 
the scales underlying the assessment are all known. At the same time, transparency 
is not full, since there is no evaluation scale for certain indicators modifying the 
initial score of the individual dimensions, and some individual variables are not 
expressed by a specific indicator. Examples of these include the indicator measuring 
the strength of the banking sector (BCA), which is a multi-component indicator of 
Moody’s, partially reflecting its subjective value judgement (Moody’s 2016a).
The evaluation of three of the four dimensions is performed on the basis of 5 to 
6 key variables, depending on the dimension, and then the model modifies the 
results obtained using additional variables. The score of the fourth dimension  – 
susceptibility to event risk – is generated using twelve key variables and is not 
influenced by additional variables. Most of the indicators considered by Moody’s are 
quantitative: for some of these the model calculates the ten-year average of historic 
and forecast values, but there are also less quantifiable variables, particularly in the 
dimensions institutional strength and susceptibility to event risk (Moody’s 2016a).
The individual variables are evaluated on specific scales ranging from 1 to 15, based 
on which the methodology of the institution allocates the variables to fifteen different 
categories. The category classifications are from “VH+” representing the highest 
grade, to “VL–” being the lowest one. Following categorisation, the methodology 
of Moody’s allocates a midpoint to each variable suitable for its category. The 
weighting of the variables within the dimension is performed in accordance with 
the midpoint obtained on the basis of the categorisation. This ensures that the 
variables belonging to the same category take the same value upon weighting. 
Naturally, the weighting of the variables may differ, depending on their importance 
within the dimension. The model aggregates the values obtained through the 
weighting within each dimension, as a result of which the scores of the dimensions 
are obtained. Thereafter, the model ranks the scores of the dimension – similarly 
to the evaluation of the individual variables – on a scale from 1 to 15, based on 
which it allocates each dimension to one of the fifteen categories (Moody’s 2016a).
After the allocation of the individual dimensions to categories, the model combines 
the four dimensions in the following way and sequence (Figure 2): The model first 
aggregates the economic strength and institutional strength dimensions, applying 
a symmetric weighting for the two. Combining the two dimensions results in the 
economic resiliency profile. In the next step, the model combines the economic 
resiliency profile with the fiscal strength dimension, resulting in the government 
financial strength profile. As the last step, the government financial strength 
profile, obtained from the aggregation of the previous three dimensions, and the 
susceptibility to event risk dimension are combined, which designates the midpoint 
of the three-notch rating range proposed by the model (Moody’s 2016a).
39
The Transparency of Credit Ratings – Reconstruction of Hungary’s Sovereign Rating
Another special methodological feature of Moody’s is that the assessment of 
external balance developments is performed in a special manner. In addition to 
the indicators capturing external vulnerability, in this dimension (susceptibility to 
event risk), Moody’s also considers indicators capturing political risk, the liquidity 
position of the general government and the vulnerability of the banking sector. The 
score of the dimension is also determined in a different way than usual: the final 
score of the variable group is obtained based on the evaluation of the indicators 
of the area deemed to represent the highest risk of the four tested areas, i.e. the 
one with the highest score (Moody’s 2016a).
4.2. Special features of the Standard & Poor’s methodology
S&P assesses sovereign credit risk using five dimensions. The variables considered in 
the five dimensions are included in Annex 2 at the end of the paper. The evaluation 
of three of the five dimensions – economic, fiscal and external assessment – is 
performed on the basis of well quantifiable data, while the model evaluates the 
other two dimensions – institutional and monetary policy assessment – typically 
on the basis of qualitative information (S&P 2017a). Reconstruction of the latter 
dimensions is substantially facilitated by the fact that in its latest credit rating 
reports the institution also discloses the score of the individual dimensions, and 
thus the score values of the dimensions can be determined accurately by also 
considering the textual description in the report.
In the case of the economic, fiscal and external dimensions, the institution’s 
methodology contains the variables that determine the initial score of the 
dimensions, as well as the scales underlying the evaluation, which are of great 
help for the precise reconstruction of the evaluation of the dimensions. The 
evaluation of the institutional dimension is performed entirely on a subjective basis: 
Figure 2
Schematic chart of the aggregation of the dimensions included in the Moody’s 
methodology
Economic
strength
Government Bond Rating Range
Government Financial Strength
Economic Resiliency
Institutional
strength Fiscal strength
Susceptibility to
event risk
Source: Based on Moody’s (2016a)
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neither the methodology of the institution nor the credit rating reports specify any 
indicators that substantiate the score for this dimension. The methodology divides 
the evaluation of the monetary policy dimension into two parts: it assesses the 
exchange rate regime pursued by the sovereign issuer on the one hand, and the 
credibility and effectiveness of its monetary policy on the other (S&P 2017a).
S&P evaluates all of the key variables on an individual scale from 1 to 6. The score of 
the five dimensions is obtained on the basis of the score of the variable belonging 
to the individual dimensions. Subsequently, considering additional criteria, the S&P 
model can modify the initial scores obtained on the basis of the key variables by 
a maximum of two or three scores, depending on the dimension. The methodological 
documentation contains the modifying factors considered within the individual 
dimensions, as well as the conditions to be fulfilled to ensure that the amended model 
returns the originally obtained score. For example, one of the areas underlying the 
evaluation of the fiscal dimension is evaluated one score lower, if a predetermined 
level is exceeded by at least two of the foreign currency ratios for government debt, 
the government securities holding of non-residents, the sovereign exposure of the 
banking sector or the volatility of the debt service profile parameters (S&P 2017a).
In the case of S&P (Figure 3), the process of combining the dimensions is simpler 
than at Moody’s. As a first step, the model combines the score of the institutional 
and economic dimensions, the arithmetic average of which designates the score 
of the institutional and economic profile. In the next step, the model calculates 
the average of the scores of the fiscal, external and monetary policy dimensions, 
thereby obtaining the flexibility and performance profile. As the last step, the model 
takes the arithmetic average of the two profiles, which designates the midpoint of 
the three-notch rating range (S&P 2017a).
Figure 3
Schematic chart of the aggregation of the dimensions included in the S&P 
methodology
Fiscal assessment Monetaryassessment
External
assessment
Economic
assessment
Institutional
assessment
Indicative rating level
Flexibility and performance proﬁleInstitutional and economic proﬁle
Source: Based on S&P (2017a)
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4.3. Special features of the Fitch Ratings methodology
Similarly to Moody’s, Fitch also evaluates the sovereign credit risk using four 
dimensions (Annex 3). In contrast to the other two dominant rating agencies, Fitch 
uses a multivariate regression model for the sovereign rating rather than predefined 
scales, based on which the methodology allocates weights to the individual 
variables (Fitch 2017a). The weights are defined objectively, solely on the basis of 
the regression model’s coefficients, which also means that the institution regularly 
reviews the weights allocated to the variables and modifies them as necessary. The 
weights show what percentage of the variance of the rating is explained by the 
variance of the respective group of variables.
According to Fitch’s latest analytical framework, the model rating is influenced to 
the highest degree (55 per cent) by the dimension containing the structural features 
of the economy. The second most important dimension is the group of variables 
capturing the external balance (external finances) and general government (public 
finance) developments, each with a weight of 17.3 per cent. This is followed by the 
dimension including the indicators describing macroeconomic performance, with 
a weight of 10.4 per cent. For half of the variables grouped within the dimensions, 
the model considers the average of the data calculated for the current year, the 
value of the previous year and the value estimated for the next year, but the 
institution does not publish regular information on the estimated data in its credit 
rating reports (Fitch 2017a). This means that when reconstructing the model 
calculations, we can rely on assumptions, at the most, in determining these values.
In the interests of making the rating calculated by the model more accurate, from 
time to time the institution also considers less quantifiable variables (qualitative 
overlay), which – based on a comparison with sovereign issuers with identical credit 
ratings (peer analysis) – may upgrade or the downgrade the rating of the sovereign 
issuer under review by as many as three grades (Fitch 2017a). In the report on the 
respective review, Fitch regularly mentions the modifying factors considered for 
the purpose of the rating, which may help reconstruct the model calculation more 
accurately.
The credit rating methodology of Fitch also differs from the analytical framework 
of the other two institutions in the sense that the model does not create different 
profiles after determining the scores of the individual groups of variables. The scores 
of the groups of variables are obtained as the sum of the product of the variables 
included therein and the regression coefficient belonging to them. Fitch also 
publishes the constant value of the regression model (intercept term). Accordingly, 
the rating is obtained as result of the published regression model (Figure 4), while 
the scores of the individual dimensions quantify the degree to which they contribute 
to the credit rating (Fitch 2017a).
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5. Reconstruction of the model calculations of the three rating agencies
In the next part, we reconstruct the model calculations of the three credit rating 
agencies for Hungary. In all three cases, the reconstruction is performed for the date4 
of the latest available credit rating decision, in accordance with the methodological 
documentation valid at the time of the review. The values of the indicators used 
for the purpose of the model calculation are included, as mentioned before, in 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3.
Before presenting the results, it should be noted that the potential difference 
between the ratings obtained on the basis of the reconstruction of the model 
calculations and the real ratings maintained by the credit rating agencies may be 
attributable to three factors. On the one hand, the methodological documentations 
presented in the previous section are not fully transparent at any of the institutions. 
On the other hand, two of the three rating agencies do not publish information on 
all of data they consider, and thus the different result may be also attributable to the 
difference in the input data used. Naturally, for the purpose of the model calculation, 
we used the data sources specified in the methodological documentation whenever 
possible. Finally, in the methodological documentation, all three rating agencies 
point out that the rating committee may also approve a rating that differs somewhat 
from the result calculated by the model, and we were not able to take this into 
consideration based on the available information in the case of all institutions.
In an ideal case, reconstruction of the ratings is based on the knowledge of the 
methodologies, and the sources and accurate calculation of the used indicators. 
4  At the time of writing this paper, the date of the latest available credit rating review was 4 November 2016 
in the case of Moody’s, 16 February 2018 in the case of S&P and 9 March 2018 in the case of Fitch.
Figure 4
Dimensions included in the Fitch methodology and their weights
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Source: Based on Fitch (2017a)
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However, this higher level reconstruction – to a different degree at each institution 
– is not feasible: as shown in Annexes 1 to 3, there are some input data at each 
rating agency which cannot be determined from external sources independent 
of the institution. Thus, in this paper, we can attempt the reconstruction only at 
a lower level from the outset: i.e. the question is whether we can obtain the rating 
maintained by the institution by combining the publicly available inputs with the 
inputs included in the institution’s reports, and by following the methodology. In the 
following, in several cases, it was found that even this methodological transparency 
is prejudiced or the preliminary result is overruled by the rating committee.
5.1. Reconstruction of the Moody’s model calculation
Upon the assessment of the individual variables, Moody’s uses the data and 
estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC), 
the World Bank (WB), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the national 
statistical offices (Moody’s 2015), and thus we tried to use the same sources. At 
the same time, in the case of defining the values of certain indicators we were only 
able to rely on the Moody’s credit rating report (Annex 1).
As presented in the previous section, Moody’s assesses sovereign issuers using four 
groups of variables in the dimensions: economic strength, institutional strength, 
fiscal strength and susceptibility to event risk. We describe the result of the model 
calculation using these four dimensions and the evaluation of the profiles created 
from the dimensions.
In its credit rating report, Moody’s allocated a “moderate level” classification to 
the rating of the economic resiliency profile, resulting from the combination of the 
economic strength and institutional strength dimensions (Moody’s 2016b), which 
on the scale of fifteen under the Moody’s analytical framework corresponds to one 
of the “M–”, “M” or “M+” category classifications (Moody’s 2015). Based on the 
methodological steps presented in the previous section, for the economic strength 
dimension, the determinant variables of which take the values indicated in Annex 
1, our calculations returned a rating of “M”, while for the institutional strength 
dimension we calculated a value of “H”, and thus the economic resiliency profile 
created from the two dimensions was rated “H–”, which differs from the “moderate 
level” rating included in the report.
As mentioned before, one of the reasons for the difference between Moody’s 
results and our calculations could be that Moody’s attached a different value 
to one or several variables determining the dimension as compared to the one 
presented in Annex 1. Thus, reconstruction of the input data presumably was not 
fully successful in the case of the first two dimensions. There may be an explanation 
for the reconstruction of the methodology, according to which Moody’s believes, 
for example, that the qualitative indicators underlying the evaluation of institutional 
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strength5 do not always provide a true view on the institutional and political situation 
of the sovereign issuers, and thus the rating committee may disregard those, as 
necessary (Moody’s 2015). However, in this case we deem this unlikely, since the 
institution makes no reference whatsoever to this in the report on the upgrading.
According to our calculations, based on the key indicators, Moody’s calculated 
a value of “H–” for the fiscal strength dimension, which received a negative 
adjustment of two categories6 due to the level of the foreign currency ratio of 
government debt, and thus finally the dimension may have been rated “M”. 
Accordingly, based on our calculations, the government financial strength profile, 
created by the aggregation of the economic resiliency profile and the fiscal strength 
dimension, received a rating of “M+”.
According to our calculations, within the susceptibility to event risk dimension, 
the highest aggregated score was achieved by the indicators in the banking sector 
vulnerability area – i.e. the indicator measuring the strength of the banking sector 
(BCA), the total assets of banks as a percentage of GDP, and the loan-to-deposit 
ratio (see Annex 1) – and thus, due to the special definition of the dimension’s 
score, the dimension’s rating of “M+” was designated on the basis of the score for 
this area. The result of the aggregation of the government financial strength profile 
and the susceptibility to event risk dimension shows that upon the upgrading on 
4 November 2016 the Moody’s methodology designated the ranges of “Ba2” and 
“Baa3”, and the “Ba1” range midpoint (Figure 5), which is one notch lower than the 
actual rating of “Baa3” maintained by the rating agency (Moody’s 2016b).
5  World Bank Government Effectiveness Index, Rule of Law Index and Control of Corruption Index
6  In the Moody’s methodology, the foreign currency ratio of government debt is one way to amend the initial 
score obtained from the values of the key indicators; if its value is high, it may downgrade the dimension 
by as many as six measures.
Figure 5
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Thus, the model calculation returned a result that differs from the actual rating 
maintained by the institution, which illustrates with regard to the testing of the 
Hungarian data that – based on the model and the available information – the credit 
ratings by Moody’s can only be reconstructed with approximate accuracy for the 
time being. Nevertheless, we managed to obtain a rating for the Hungarian foreign 
currency-denominated government debt that falls within the indicative rating range 
by working with the input data estimated from the sources shown in Annex 1, in 
accordance with the methodological documentation. Since Moody’s did not publish its 
estimation for all indicators used, the explanation of the difference between the actual 
rating and the reconstructed rating is not unambiguous: it can be explained both by 
the difference in the input data and the inadequacy of methodological transparency. 
It should also be noted that in addition to the methodological documentation of 
Moody’s, we also relied on the information included in the credit rating report.7
5.2. Reconstruction of the model calculation by S&P
In its credit rating reports, S&P publishes most of the statistical data it takes into 
consideration for the purpose of the review, and thus, in contrast to the calculations 
for Moody’s, we used the data included in the report for the model calculation 
(see: Annex 2). The reason for this is that for most of the variables taken into 
consideration, S&P uses its own estimates and forecasts for the next three years, 
and we lack sufficient information on the models used for the forecast.
S&P rates the sovereign issuers using five aspects: the institutional, economic, fiscal, 
external and monetary policy dimensions (S&P 2017a). We present the results of 
the model calculation using the assessment of the individual dimensions, as before.
The S&P report on the review reveals that the institution allocated a score of 4 to 
the institutional assessment (S&P 2018). As emphasised in the presentation of the 
special features of the methodology, S&P does not substantiate the assessment 
of the institutional dimension using specific indicators: it determines the value of 
the dimension based on the efficiency and stability of political decision-making 
and the functioning of checks and balances, relying on its own value judgement 
(S&P 2017a). In the report on the rating under review, S&P justified the relatively 
low score, among other things, by stating that in its opinion as a result of the 
institutional changes introduced since 2010, the system of checks and balances 
has weakened, which restricts the predictability of political decision-making, 
and the measures aimed at the restriction of mass media and non-governmental 
organisations resulted in increasing political centralisation (S&P 2018).
The initial score of the economic assessment is based on GDP per capita, estimated 
by S&P for the respective year in the amount of USD 15,500, which yields a score of 
4 in the methodological documentation. In our opinion, the score of the dimension 
7  See, for example, the values of the indicators shown in Annex 1.
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was not influenced by any modifying factor, and thus the score of the institutional 
and economic profile, generated from the two dimensions, was also 4.
S&P divides the fiscal assessment into two parts, i.e. fiscal performance and 
flexibility, and debt burden. The first is obtained based on the change in the GDP-
proportionate net government debt, while the latter is obtained based on the ratio 
of the GDP-proportionate nominal government debt and the general government 
interest expenditures and revenues. The final score of the dimension is obtained as 
the arithmetic mean of the score of the two parts (S&P 2017a). S&P, corresponding 
to our own calculations, gave a score of 2 for the fiscal performance and flexibility 
based on the average change in the net government debt of 2.6 per cent. The 
prevailing score of 4 for the debt burden (S&P 2018) comes from average value 
of 65.1 per cent of the GDP-proportionate nominal government debt, and the 
average ratio of 6.2 per cent in the general government interest expenditure and 
revenues. Accordingly, the score for the two areas estimated on the basis of S&P’s 
data corresponds to the prevailing scores, and based on the average of these two, 
the fiscal assessment may have received a score of 3.
The initial score of the external assessment is obtained as the ratio of gross external 
financing needs to the sum of the current account receipts plus usable official 
foreign exchange reserves, and as the ratio of the narrow net external debt to the 
current account receipts (S&P 2017a). Upon the review, based on the S&P data 
the first value was 96.3 per cent, while the ratio of the narrow net external debt to 
current account receipts took the average value of 17.9 per cent. Accordingly, based 
on our own calculations, the dimension received a score of 2, which corresponds 
to S&P’s assessment (S&P 2018).
For the monetary policy assessment, S&P maintained the score of 4 (S&P 2018). The 
institution assesses this dimension on the basis of the sovereign issuer’s exchange 
rate policy and the effectiveness of its monetary policy. The exchange rate policy, 
based on the categorisation of the IMF exchange rate regime, receives a score of 
3 in the S&P guide. At the same time, for the assessment of the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, we relied on the information published by S&P in prior reviews 
(see e.g. S&P 2017b), since no distinct change has taken place in this area since the 
date of the last rating, and hence presumably S&P’s opinion has not changed either. 
Based on these, the monetary policy effectiveness received a score of 4. All of this 
is also supported by the report on the February 2018 credit rating, where the rating 
agency explains that in its view the accumulated non-performing loan portfolio still 
curbs the effectiveness of Hungarian monetary policy transmission (S&P 2018).
The result of our model calculation was obtained as the combination of the input data 
included in S&P’s reports, the textual assessment of a qualitative nature included in the 
previous reports and the methodological information related to the classification of the 
dimensions. The score of the flexibility and performance profile created from the score 
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calculated by us for the three dimensions (external assessment 2, fiscal assessment 3, 
monetary policy assessment 3.6) was 2.86, which – combining it with the institutional 
and economic profile score of 4 – designated the “BBB–” midpoint of the range (Figure 6). 
This corresponds to the February 2018 rating maintained by S&P (S&P 2018).
Based on the result, it can be stated that in the case of S&P, the available 
methodological documentation and the exact knowledge of part of the data 
considered by the institution renders the precise reconstruction of Hungary’s 
credit rating possible. Accordingly, the published methodological documentation 
was transparent in the sense that we were able to reconstruct the Hungarian rating 
properly. At the same time, it was not possible to generate independent input data, 
and thus we made no attempt to perform an analysis assuming a higher degree of 
reconstructibility, making the calculation relying on our own data.
5.3. Reconstruction of the model calculation by Fitch
For the reconstruction of Fitch’s model calculation, we made attempts, as in the 
case of Moody’s, to use the data of institutions specified in the methodology, i.e. 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the national 
statistical offices. However, despite our efforts, for some of the indicators we were 
compelled to refer to the reports of Fitch, i.e. full reconstruction of the inputs 
cannot be achieved in the case of the third rating agency either (see: Annex 3).
As noted earlier in the presentation of the special features of the methodology, 
Fitch’s credit rating model differs significantly from that of the other two rating 
agencies. Although in the past years Fitch has published more and more details on 
its credit rating methodology, the reproducibility of the model calculation without 
Figure 6
Reconstruction of the February 2018 rating by S&P
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the forecast values of certain variables is still questionable, since the institution 
does not publish the values used for all of the indicators taken into consideration.
At Fitch, the dimension with the highest weight is the group of variables capturing 
the structural features of the economy. The score of the dimension is obtained on 
the basis of the World Bank’s governance indicators, GDP per capita, the world-
GDP ratio, the number of years elapsed since the last default and the broad money 
supply (Fitch 2017a). The score of the dimension can be well estimated, since the 
institution defines the value of all indicators based on the latest available data, 
which can be accessed in the aforementioned statistical databases. Based on the 
weighting of the indicator’s value, according to our calculations, the score of the 
dimension in March 2018 was 7.60, which – according to the credit rating report – 
was not influenced by any modifying factors.
One of the dimensions with the second highest importance is the group of variables 
capturing external balance developments (external finances). The score of the 
dimension is determined by the reserve currency flexibility, net external assets as 
a percentage of GDP, commodity dependence, external interest service, the sum of 
the current account balance and FDI inflow and foreign exchange reserves. It is more 
difficult to accurately estimate the score for this dimension, since in the case of 
three of the five variables it considers the average of data calculated for the current 
year, last year’s data and the value estimated for the next year, which we cannot 
determine precisely in the absence of Fitch’s forecasts8 (Fitch 2017a). Based on the 
weighting, the dimension had a value of –0.09, which was reduced by the rating 
committee by further one notch, and thus, according to our calculations, the score of 
the dimension at the time of the current review may have been –1.09 (Fitch 2018).
The third dimension assessed by Fitch is the group of variables capturing the general 
government developments (public finances). The score for this dimension comes from 
the GDP-proportionate government debt, the foreign currency ratio of the government 
debt, the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP and the ratio of interest service and 
general government revenues. Here as well, the estimation of the dimension’s score 
was complicated by the fact that the value of all variables comes from the average 
of historic, current and forecast data. At the same time, in one of the background 
materials we managed to find approximate values for two of the four values (Fitch 
2017b), which somewhat eased the calculations. Based on the weighting, according 
to our calculations, the public finances dimension acquired the value of –2.01, which, 
according to the report, was not modified by the committee (Fitch 2018).
The fourth group of variables, with the lowest significance, is the dimension 
comprising the indicators describing macroeconomic performance. The variables 
primarily considered in this dimension include real GDP growth, real GDP volatility 
8  The calculation of the dimension’s score was further complicated by the fact that no data were available for 
Hungary’s external interest service values in the statistical databases defined in the analytical framework. 
Upon the weighting of the value, we calculated using the median of the countries with similar rating.
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and inflation. The estimation of the score for the macroeconomic performance 
dimension was also complicated by the fact that in the case of two of the three 
indicators, Fitch also considers forecast values; however, the background material 
mentioned earlier once again helped us to determine the estimated value. According 
to our calculations, the initial score for the dimension at the time of the review may 
have been –0.71, reduced by the rating committee by further one notch, and thus 
the dimension had the final score of –1.71.
As mentioned earlier, Fitch – in contrast to the other two rating agencies – creates no 
profiles after determining the score of the individual groups of variables; it simply adds 
up the scores obtained based on the weighting, and supplements it with the constant 
value of the regression model. Based on the model calculation described above, the 
sum of the dimensions’ score was 4.79, while – according to the analytical framework 
of 2017 – the constant value was 4.018 (Fitch 2017a). Thus the result of our own model 
calculation, without considering the amendments specified in the reports, is a score 
of 8.81, which designates a rating of “BBB+”. Of course, this does not correspond 
to the March 2018 rating of “BBB–” maintained by the institution. If we adjust our 
calculations with the amendments applied by the rating committee (–2 notches), 
the obtained final score of 6.81 is equivalent to the current “BBB–” rating (Figure 7).
Although the reconstruction of the Fitch model calculations returned a result for 
Hungary different from the actual credit rating, when we examined the methodology 
and reconstructed the credit rating, we found that – in contrast to the finding of 
Ligeti – Szőrfi in 2016 – the new methodological documentation is already detailed 
Figure 7
Reconstruction of the March 2018 rating by Fitch
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and transparent enough to allow for the modelling of the institution’s credit rating 
with good approximation.
In our view, the above result was influenced by the following factors: On the one 
hand, the values given by Fitch to the indicators also including the estimates of the 
institution are not known, and, according to the methodological model, the weight 
of these is not determinant. We also saw that if we substitute the inputs in the model 
identically with the institution, our results correspond to the primary dimension values 
reported by Fitch. The additional differences are attributable to the fact that the rating 
committee adjusted the calculated dimension value on two occasions. We were able 
to verify this on the basis of the public data, because Fitch, in its latest report on 
Hungary’s credit rating, disclosed whether the rating committee had changed the 
originally obtained score for any dimension. However, we do not know whether the 
institution will regularly publish this information in the future as well, in the absence 
of which the reconstruction attempt would be less assessable.
6. Conclusion
Based on the analyses related to Hungary’s foreign currency-denominated debt, this 
paper illustrated the degree of accuracy to which, given the present transparency 
of the credit rating processes and methodological documentation, the ratings of 
sovereign issuers of the big three rating agencies can be reconstructed. With a view 
to answering our research questions, we provided a brief overview of the relevant 
domestic and international literature, and presented – along the IMF paper – the basic 
roles fulfilled by the credit rating agencies in the global financial system: they provide 
information on issuers, encourage borrowers to take corrective measures and provide 
the rated entities with certificates. However, their work is not free from methodological 
errors and moral hazard, as seen by market participants in 2008 during the crisis. As 
a response to this, the regulation of rating agencies and oversight of their activity 
appeared as a requirement of market participants after the crisis. Transparency also 
features among the regulatory requirements, which we discuss in detail in this paper.
We based our paper partially on a series of articles published by two Hungarian co-
authors, who earlier analysed to what degree the credit rating steps can be modelled. 
The referenced papers report substantial results. However, the methodological 
documentation, more detailed than before, published by the rating agencies in recent 
years, allowed us to understand the rating agencies’ decision-making processes more 
accurately and subject the latest methodological documentation to a review similar to 
that performed by Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016). However, in contrast to them, we performed 
our analysis for a single country, i.e. for Hungary, as a case study.
In order to answer our research question, we used the credit rating methodology of 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, as well as the information included in the published reports. 
We always calculated the values of the indicators necessary for the credit rating models 
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from the sources specified by the rating agencies, whenever this was possible. Right at 
this point, we made a necessary compromise: full reconstructibility of the inputs was 
not feasible with any of the institutions. The weakest institution in this respect was S&P: 
in the case of S&P, in the vast majority of the cases, we used the inputs communicated 
by the institution, while in the case of the other two rating agencies, reconstruction 
of the inputs was much more successful. In the course of our model calculations, we 
found that – with the current level of transparency – the reconstruction of the credit 
rating of Hungary’s foreign currency-denominated debt by S&P could be performed the 
most accurately. The result illustrates that upon using inputs corresponding to those 
of S&P, the published methodology is transparent enough to reconstruct each step of 
the model calculation correctly. The result of the model calculation performed for the 
review by Moody’s showed that the ratings of the institution related to Hungary can be 
reconstructed only with approximate accuracy for the time being. The reason for the 
difference may be equally attributable to the deviation in the values of used variables 
or to the absence of methodological transparency. However, we have no information in 
this respect. Compared to the work of Ligeti-Szőrfi, the largest improvement was shown 
by the transparency of Fitch. The reconstructibility of the inputs ran into difficulties, and 
thus we also had to consider information included in the report for several variables, 
or the correct value of the variable was not clear (see: Annex 3). At the same time, the 
transparency of the model proved to be adequate according to the analyses performed 
for Hungary. If we adjust the result of our calculations for the amendments by the rating 
committee, we obtain the rating maintained by the institution.
In summary, it can be stated that the transparency of the three institutions has 
improved compared to what was presented in an earlier analysis performed by 
Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016). At the same time, major progress could only be achieved if 
the rating agencies calculated the input indicators of the model from known data 
sources with known calculation at all times. However, the functioning of the models 
can be sufficiently reconstructed to allow the decision-makers of sovereign issuers, 
economists and market participants to see when and how a change in the data 
related to a sovereign issuer may be integrated into the credit rating. However, at 
the current level of transparency, predicting rating actions – which was our initial 
future research direction – is not only hampered, for the time being, by the fact 
that the rating committee may amend the initial rating, but also by the identified 
uncertainties of the modelling and the input data. The conclusions we have drawn 
based on the present case study would be more generalisable if – similarly to 
Ligeti – Szőrfi (2016) – we performed the model calculations for several countries. 
Such a research would allow us to implement analyses – far beyond the scope 
of our present study – based on which we could shed light on whether there are 
sovereigns, and what characterises them, for which the model calculations can be 
performed more accurately. If the level of transparency was to improve further, it 
would also be an interesting research direction to explore whether considering the 
same data that is used by the institutions would lead to identical dimension scores 
and ratings at all times, or there are under/overvalued sovereigns.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Variables taken into consideration for the purpose of Moody’s model 
calculation and the source thereof
Moody’s Investor Service
Variable group Indicator Value Source
Economic 
strength
Average real GDP growth (per cent) 2.0 IMF WEO
Real GDP volatility (per cent) 3.1 IMF WEO
WEF competitiveness index 4.3 WEF
Nominal GDP (USD billions) 120.6 IMF WEO
GDP per capita (PPP, USD) 26,275.3 IMF WEO
Fiscal strength
Government debt as a percentage of GDP (per cent) 74.7 Eurostat
Government debt/government revenues (per cent) 157 Eurostat
Interest servicing/government revenues (per cent) 7.3 Eurostat
Interest servicing/GDP (per cent) 3.5 Eurostat
Foreign currency ratio within government debt (per 
cent)
30
Government 
Debt 
Management 
Agency
Institutional 
strength
Government Effectiveness Index 0.491794795 World Bank
Rule of Law Index 0.404108435 World Bank
Control of Corruption Index 0.104408205 World Bank
Inflation (per cent) 2.2 IMF WEO
Volatility of inflation (per cent) 2.6 IMF WEO
Susceptibility to 
event risk
Internal politics risk – –
Geopolitical risk – –
Gross borrowing requirement/GDP (per cent) 23.2
Government 
Debt 
Management 
Agency, IMF
Non-residents’ government securities holdings (per 
cent)
47.8 Eurostat
Implied credit rating based on market indices Baa3 Moody’s
Total assets/GDP (per cent) 102 ECB
Baseline Credit Assessment b1 Moody’s
Loan-to-deposit ratio (per cent) 81 MNB
Current account + FDI/GDP (per cent) –1.1 World Bank
External vulnerability index (per cent) 114 Moody’s
Net international investment position/GDP (per cent) –64.4 Eurostat
Note: With the exception of average real GDP growth, the real GDP volatility and the volatility of 
inflation, the values of the individual indicators are always the latest data available at the time of the 
respective rating.
53
The Transparency of Credit Ratings – Reconstruction of Hungary’s Sovereign Rating
Annex 2: Variables taken into consideration for the purpose of Standard and 
Poor’s model calculation and the source thereof
Standard and Poor’s
Variable group Indicator Value Source
Economic assessment GDP per capita (USD thousands) 15.5 S&P
External assessment
Gross external financing requirement/current account 
revenues + reserves (per cent)
96.3
S&P
Narrow net external debt/current account receipts (per cent) 17.9
Status of the currency in international transactions –
Fiscal assessment
Net government debt as a percentage of GDP (per cent) 65.1
S&PInterest burden/government revenues (per cent) 6.2
Change in the government debt/GDP (per cent) 2.6
Monetary assessment
Exchange rate regime 3 IMF
Credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy 4
Previous 
S&P 
information
Note: With the exception of the exchange rate regime and the efficiency of the monetary policy, all 
indicators are the average of the value estimated by S&P for the respective year and the forecast for the 
next three years.
Annex 3: Variables taken into consideration for the purpose of the Fitch model 
calculation and the source thereof
Fitch Ratings
Variable group Indicator Value Source
Macroeconomic 
performance
Real GDP growth (per cent) 3.1 IMF WEO
Real GDP volatility (per cent) 2.9 IMF WEO
Inflation (per cent) 1.7 IMF WEO
Public finances
Government debt as a percentage of GDP (per cent) 72.8 IMF WEO
Interest servicing/government revenues (per cent) 6.8 Eurostat
Foreign currency ratio within government debt  
(per cent)
23.5
Government Debt 
Management Agency
Fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP (per cent) –2.1 Fitch, OECD
External 
finances
Net external assets/GDP (per cent) 2.5 World Bank
Commodity dependence (per cent) 10 WTO, World Bank
Current account + FDI/GDP (per cent) 5.1 Fitch
Reserve currency flexibility – IMF
External interest servicing (per cent) 4.3 Fitch
Reserves/import (number of months) 2.6 World Bank
Structural 
features
Average of World Bank governance indicators 66.4 World Bank
GDP per capita (percentile) 56.5 World Bank
Share in global GDP (per cent) 0.2 World Bank
Broad money supply/GDP (per cent) 60.1 World Bank
Note: The values of the indicators are not solely the latest data available at the time of the respective 
rating; in the Fitch model, in the case of certain indicators, multi-year averages or variances serve as 
input. In addition to the historic data, from time to time future estimated data are also necessary for the 
calculation of the indicators, where the model used by Fitch for the forecast is not known, just like the 
estimated forecasts. 
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